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SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS-THE LOST ROLE OF
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
IN SECURING AN ACCUSED'S
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL
JURY
Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Ross v. Oklahoma I severely
weakened the role of the peremptory challenge 2 as a procedural
safeguard to the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.3 The
Court reasoned that a defendant's loss of a peremptory challenge in
a capital4 trial caused by the trial court's error in failing to remove a
venireman 5 for cause 6 did not constitute a violation of the accused's
sixth amendment rights. 7 The Court refused to apply literally to the
facts of Ross the rule set forth in Gray v. Mississippi.8 Rather, the
Court concluded that, as long as no proof of partiality existed as to
1 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988).
2 A peremptory challenge is the mechanism used by either plaintiff's or defendant's
counsel to excuse potential jurors who would not otherwise be excluded for cause by the
court. See infra note 6. A peremptory challenge is "exercised without a reason stated,
without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 220 (1964).
3 The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ....... U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
4 A capital trial is one in which the "death penalty may, but need not necessarily, be
imposed." BLAcK's LAw DiCTIONARY 189 (5th ed. 1979).
5 A venireman is a member of the venire, the pool from which the eventual mem-
bers of the jury are drawn. Id. at 1395.
6 A challenge "for cause" is a mechanism used by the court to exclude potential
jurors from becoming part of ajury. The court exercises "for cause" challenges when a
potential juror is seen by the court as incapable of following the law and adhering to
his/her duty as a juror. Jurors can only be excluded in this fashion on "a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
7 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2278.
8 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987)(addressing the issue of forfeiture of peremptory challenges
caused by trial court error).
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the jurors who actually sat, the defendant's loss of a peremptory
challenge caused by trial court error did not violate the sixth
amendment.9
The Court further weakened the stature of the peremptory
challenge mechanism by proclaiming that the rules for the exercise
of peremptory challenges should be governed solely by state law.' 0
The majority opinion declared that only a state court is able "to de-
termine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define
their purpose and the manner of their exercise."" In so ruling, the
Court, in essence, stated that it could not, on sixth amendment
grounds, strike down a state scheme implementing peremptory
challenges. As long as a defendant was receiving all of "that which
state law provides," the Supreme Court could not object to any state
scheme.'
2
This Note considers the Ross opinions and concludes that the
majority decision needlessly jeopardizes both the role and the value
of the peremptory challenge in the trial process in a manner totally
inconsistent with the prior Court ruling in Gray.' 3 This Note argues
that the Ross decision conflicts with precedent because it fails to con-
sider, even cursorily, the analytical framework previously estab-
lished for determining when trial court error may be considered
harmless and, therefore, not an infringement upon an accused's
right to an impartial jury. Moreover, this Note argues that the ma-
jority, in hastily concluding that state-created rules governing the
exercise of peremptory challenges are not subject to judicial re-
view,14 fails to consider sufficiently the potential burden that an un-
monitored state scheme might place upon an accused's right to an
impartial jury. Finally, this Note concludes that the majority's at-
tempt in Ross to limit federal influence upon state peremptory
schemes ignores both the existence and the value of prior Supreme
Court involvement in that sphere, such as federal abolition of state
peremptory schemes which promote racial discrimination in the jury
selection process. Supreme Court involvement should be en-
couraged and expanded to protect an accused whose very life is at
stake.
9 Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2278 (1988).
10 Id. at 2279.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
14 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2279. The majority stated, "the 'right' to peremptory chal-
lenges is 'denied or impaired' only if the defendant does not receive that which state law
provides." Id. at 2279 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
While robbing a motel in Elk City, Oklahoma, petitioner, Bobby
Lynn Ross, killed a police officer. 15 Ross was subsequently charged
with first degree murder, a capital offense in Oklahoma. 16
The jury selection process for the trial of petitioner Ross began
with the drawing of twelve names from the 150 person venire.' 7
Once twelve jurors were "provisionally" seated, the parties then
used their peremptory challenges alternately and beginning with the
prosecution, to remove additional jurors. 18
Under Oklahoma law, both parties in capital trials are afforded
nine peremptory challenges. 19 In the jury selection process for
Ross' trial, the above process was repeated until each side had exer-
cised or waived its peremptory challenges.
20
After the defense used its fifth peremptory challenge, venire-
man Darrell Huling was drawn to replace the juror just excused.2 1
During voir dire, Huling initially stated that, under the proper cir-
cumstances, he would be willing to consider imposing a life sen-
tence upon petitioner Ross. 22 However, upon further examination
by defense counsel, Huling stated he would vote to impose the
death penalty if the jury found Ross guilty. 23 The defense moved to
have Huling removed for cause, arguing that Huling would not be
able to adhere to the law at the penalty phase.24 However, the trial
court denied the motion and provisionally seated Huling.25 As a
result of the court's ruling, defense counsel was compelled to exer-
15 Id. at 2275.
16 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (West 1983) provides in pertinent part: "A
person.., commits the crime of murder in the first degree when he takes the life of a
human being, regardless of malice, in the commission of forcible rape, robbery with a
dangerous weapon, kidnapping, escape from lawful custody, first degree burglary or first
degree arson." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (West 1983), provides that "[a]
person who is convicted or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first de-
gree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life."
17 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2275. Both counsel and the Court individually questioned each
of the twelve arbitrarily selected veniremen, as is customary in such proceedings. When-
ever the Court excused a potential juror for cause, the Court would call in another
venireman to replace him or her. Id. at 2275-76.
18 Id. at 2275-76. When a juror was struck, a replacement juror was selected, ques-
tioned in the above manner, and provisionally seated for further questioning by both
parties. Id. at 2275.
19 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 655 (1969).




24 Id. Defense counsel objected to Huling because Huling indicated his unwilling-
ness to consider all possible penalties if Ross were found guilty. Id.
25 Id.
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cise its sixth peremptory challenge to remove Huling.26 The de-
fense ultimately used all nine of its peremptory challenges, while the
prosecutor exercised only five challenges and waived the remaining
four.
2 7
Defense counsel did not challenge for cause any of the twelve
jurors ultimately selected. 28 At the close ofjury selection, however,
the defense objected "to the composition of the twelve people, in
that there were no black people called as jurymen in this case and
the defendant [who is black] feels he is denied a fair and impartial
trial by his peers." 29 The trial court overruled the objection and the
trial began.a
0
At trial, the jury found petitioner guilty of first degree mur-
der.3' At the penalty phase, the same jury found five aggravating
circumstances and sentenced the petitioner to death.
3 2
Defense counsel appealed the decision, arguing that the trial
court had committed reversible error in failing to remove venireman
Huling for cause.3 3 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ac-
cepted defense counsel's argument that a venireman possessing be-
liefs such as those expressed by venireman Huling at the voir dire
phase should be removed for cause by a trial court; however, the
appellate court refused to reverse the trial court decision on the
grounds that no evidence was presented to suggest that any juror
who actually sat during Ross' trial was objectionable.
3 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-







32 Id. An aggravating circumstance is a "circumstance attending the commission of a
crime or tort which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences,
but which is above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime or tort itself."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 60 (5th ed. 1979). The aggravating circumstances found by the
jury were that Ross knowingly created a risk of death to more than one person, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21 § 701.12(2) (1981), that the murder was especially heinous, attrocious, or
cruel, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.12(4) (1981), that the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution, OKLA. STAT. tit. 2
§ 701.12(5) (1981), that there was a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society, OKLA. STAT. tit.
21 § 701.12(7) (1981), and that the victim of the murder was a peace officer, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 1 § 707.12(8) (1981). Brief for Petitioner at 8, Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273
(1988)(No. 86-5309).
33 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2276.
34 Ross v. Oklahoma, 717 P.2d 117, 120 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
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court's failure to remove Huling for cause and petitioner's subse-
quent use of a peremptory challenge to strike Huling.3 5
III. THE MAJORITY DECISION IN Ross
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.3 6
The majority rejected the notion that petitioner Ross' rights under
the sixth and the fourteenth amendments had been abridged 7 and
affirmed the trial court's decision.38
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected petitioner's argument that a
loss of one of his peremptory challenges constituted a violation of
the right to an impartial jury.39 Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded
that the trial court, in failing to excuse Huling for cause, errone-
ously deprived petitioner of the beneficial exercise of one of his per-
emptory challenges. 40 However, the focus of the inquiry, according
to the majority, should not have been whether the trial court erred
but whether that error actually affected the outcome of the trial by
threatening the jury's impartiality.4
1
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's analysis of the sixth amendment argu-
ment rested, not upon petitioner's opportunities lost as a result of
the trial court's error, but upon the composition of the jury mem-
bers "who ultimately sat." 42 First, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that the controversy over venireman Huling was irrelevant to the
consideration presently before the Court because "Huling was, in
fact, removed and did not sit." 43 As for the twelve jurors who actu-
ally sat, petitioner challenged none for cause; furthermore, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that petitioner "never suggested that any of
the twelve was not impartial." 44 While petitioner "at the close of
jury selection ... did assert that the jury was not fair and impartial,
this claim was based upon the absence of blacks from the jury
panel." 45 Thus, the majority concluded that there was neither evi-
dence tending to indicate doubt as to the impartiality of the actual
35 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2276. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
"[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or propery, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2275. AssociateJustices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined the ChiefJustice in the opinion.
37 Id. at 2277.
38 Id. at 2280.
39 Id. at 2279-2280.
40 Id. at 2280.
41 Id. at 2278.
42 Id. at 2277.
43 Id. at 2278.




jurors nor legitimate allegations of non-impartiality advanced by de-
fense counsel against the actual jurors at the time ofjury selection.
46
Without these elements, the impartiality of the jury that actually sat
could not legitimately be called into question.
47
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected the assertion that the
Court's earlier case, Gray v. Mississipppi,48 mandated reversal of the
decision in the instant case on sixth amendment grounds. 49 The pe-
titioner argued that, under Gray, any error affecting jury composi-
tion mandates reversal. 50 While the majority conceded that "the
failure to remove Huling may have resulted in a jury panel different
from that which would otherwise have decided the case," they de-
clined to accept a literal application of the Gray ruling.5' The Court
distinguished the facts in Gray from the present case in that, in Gray,
an uncertainty existed as to whether the prosecution could and
would have used a peremptory challenge to remove the erroneously
excused juror.52 In Ross, however, the Court said "there is no need
to speculate whether Huling would have been removed absent the
erroneous ruling by the trial court; Huling was, in fact, removed and
did not sit.' ' 53 Thus, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
events in Ross disposed naturally of any uncertainty as to the impar-
tiality of the actual jury.54 Because the Court concluded that Gray
was inapplicable, and as no legitimate reason for doubting the im-
partiality of the jury was presented, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that there was no violation of petitioner's right to an impartial jury
under the sixth amendment. 55
The second major point of the majority opinion considered and
subsequently rejected the notion that petitioner's fourteenth
amendment rights had been violated. 56 Petitioner argued that his
right to due process was abridged by "arbitrarily depriving him of
the full complement of nine peremptory challenges allowed under
Oklahoma law." 57 Yet, the majority rejected this argument by recit-
ing Oklahoma law and by declaring that the petitioner had received
46 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "[w]e conclude that petitioner has failed to
establish that the jury was not impartial." Id.
47 Id.
48 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987).
49 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2277.





55 Id. at 2277.
56 Id. at 2278.
57 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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all that was "due [him] under Oklahoma law." a58 Chief'Justice Rehn-
quist's argument concerning the fourteenth amendment rested
upon the fundamental precept that "peremptory challenges are a
creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution." 59
While ChiefJustice Rehnqist stated that " 'the right to exercise per-
emptory challenges is one of the most important of the rights se-
cured to the accused,' "60 he qualified this statement with the
assertion that "it is for the state to determine the number of per-
emptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the
manner of their exercise." 6 1
Thus, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, determining
whether petitioner's right to due process was violated necessitated
an inquiry into whether petitioner received all he was entitled to
under Oklahoma law. 62 The majority cited the laws of Oklahoma in
determining that petitioner had, indeed, received all of that to which
he was entitled. 63 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
it is a long settled principle of Oklahoma law that a defendant who
disagrees with the trial court's ruling on a for cause challenge must, in
order to preserve the claim that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial,
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Even then, the
error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all per-
emptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.64
As Oklahoma law required counsel to remedy a court's error in
58 Id. at 2280. In making this remark about Oklahoma Law, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
cited two Oklahoma cases. In the first, Ferrel v. State, 475 P.2d 825 (Okla. Crim. App.
1970), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
error in overruling a proper challenge to a juror becomes grounds for reversal
when the defendant is forced to use one of his peremptory challenges on said juror
and that defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges, and that by reason of
this an incompetent juror was forced upon him.
Id. at 828. While not stated explicitly, one might intuit, as does ChiefJustice Rehnquist
in Ross, that grounds for reversal exist only when an incompetent juror is forced upon a
defendant, even though the court fails to state this explicitly. Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2279.
In Stott v. State, 538 P.2d 1061 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals did use more precise language: "[e]rror in overruling a proper chal-
lenge to a juror, only becomes ground for reversal when the defendant is forced to use
one of his peremptory challenges on said juror ... and, that by reason of his having
been forced to do this, an incompetent juror was forced upon him." Id. at 1065.
59 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2279. Chief Justice Rehnquist supported this statement with
citations to Gray and to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The relevant portion of
Swain cited by the Chief Justice states: "[tihere is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States which requires the Congress (or the states) to grant peremptory chal-
lenges."- Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586
(1919)).
60 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2278 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 219).






denying a removal for cause by exercising a peremptory challenge,
the petitioner had not been deprived of any rights under Oklahoma
law.65 Consequently, concluded the Court, his claim of a violation
of his due process right lacked merit.
66
IV. THE DISSENT
Justice Marshall delivered the dissenting opinion.67 Unlike the
majority opinion, the dissent addressed almost exclusively the peti-
tioner's sixth amendment argument of the right to an impartial jury.
However, it addressed both the sixth and the fourteenth amend-
ment arguments of the majority opinion by declaring the fundamen-
tal unconstitutionality of a state's ability to enact laws which
arbitrarily deprive a defendant of peremptory challenges and, thus,
place an impermissible burden upon a defendant's right to an im-
partial jury.68
In rejecting the majority view on the sixth amendment issue
presented in Ross, Justice Marshall focused upon the majority's mis-
interpretation of the Gray holding. 69 The test established in Gray for
determining whether a trial court's ruling must be overturned due
to that court's error in the jury selection process, according to Jus-
tice Marshall, is "whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole
could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error."
70
While Chief Justice Rehnquist perceived no significant effect upon
the composition of the jury caused by the trial court's error in Ross,
Justice Marshall's view was to the contrary. 7' The petitioner had
been deprived of the beneficial use of his challenges by having to
use one to correct court error.72 "That deprivation," according to
Justice Marshall, " 'could possibly have... affected' the composition
of the jury panel under the Gray standard because the defense might
have used the extra peremptory challenge to remove another juror
and because the loss of a peremptory might have affected the de-
fense's strategic use of its remaining peremptories. 73 Justice Mar-
shall further stated that " 'a prosecutor with fewer peremptory
65 Id. at 2280.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2275 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined Justice Marshall.
68 Id. at 2284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2280 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. at 2055
(1987)(emphasis added)).
71 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2280 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 2281 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2055).
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challenges in hand may be willing to accept certain jurors whom he
would not accept given a larger reserve of peremptories.' "74
Justice Marshall saw no justification for the majority view that
the Gray standard is "too sweeping to be applied literally" and per-
ceived the Gray ruling as protecting a defendant's "right to a jury
selection procedure untainted by constitutional error."' 75 Conse-
quently, Justice Marshall argued that Ross could not, as the majority
claimed, be distingished from Gray merely on the facts.76 More-
over, while justice Marshall agreed with ChiefJustice Rehnquist that
no solid proof existed for the allegation that the jury which actually
sat was not impartial, Justice Marshall further stated that "because it
is impossible to be sure that an erroneous ruling by the trial court
did not tilt the panel against the defendant, a death sentence re-
turned by such a panel cannot stand." 77
For Justice Marshall, then, if the question of whether a court's
error during jury selection in a capital case altered the jury's compo-
sition cannot be definitively resolved, this uncertainty must be de-:
cided in favor of reversal of the judgment. 78 The absence of solid
evidence as to the jurors' lack of impartiality does not ultimately
render a trial court's error harmless. 79 For Justice Marshall, the
magnitude of the proceedings in a capital case cannot allow for a
presumption ofjury impartiality in the face of court error.80 Where
a man's life is at stake, "we should not be playing games," 8' and
deprivation of the petitioner's right to a peremptory challenge
through constitutional error by the court must be considered a vio-
lation of the petitioner's sixth amendment right to an impartial
74 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 fRoss, 108 S. Ct. at 2281-2282 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated
that, under the Gray ruling, the only court errors requiring automatic reversal of a con-
viction would be "constitutional error[s]." Id. According to Justice Marshall, errors re-
quiring a trial court to start the jury selection process anew would not be grounds for
reversal under a literal application of the Gray standard, despite Justice Scalia's argu-
ment to the contrary in the Gray dissent. Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2061 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This Marshallian delineation between "constitutional error" and harmless court error is
discussed in greater detail infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
76 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2282 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
77 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 Id. A harmless error test was constructed by the Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under the Chapman rule, "before a constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. While neither the majority nor the minority
opinions in Ross xplicitly applied this test, the Chapman standard was used as an impor-
tant tool in the Court's rendering of the Gray decision.
80 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2280 (Marshall,J., dissenting).





Justice Marshall then attacked Oklahoma common law on sixth
amendment grounds. 83 Justice Marshall noted that "the state's re-
quirement that a defendant employ a peremptory challenge in order
to preserve a sixth amendment claim arising from a trial court's er-
roneous for cause ruling burdens the defendant's exercise of his
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. '8 4 Citing United States v.
Jackson85 and Brooks v. Tennessee86, Justice Marshall stated further
that "legislative schemes that unnecessarily burden the exercise of
federal constitutional rights cannot stand." 87 Accordingly, he advo-
cated the abrogation of the Oklahoma scheme as violative of the
Constitution. 8
8
Through his perception of the arbitrary deprivation of a de-
fendant's right to a peremptory challenge as a "heavy and avoidable
burden" 89 upon the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impar-
tial jury, Justice Marshall rendered moot the issue of whether peti-
tioner received all that was due him under state law.90 For Justice
Marshall, the majority's attempt to justify the trial court's error on
due process grounds only served to cloud the central issue of the
right to an impartial jury.91
82 Id.(Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 2282-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 2282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 390 U.S. 570 (1968). InJackson, the Court found that a provision of the Federal
Kidnapping Act, which rendered eligible for the death penalty only those defendants
who invoked their right to trial by jury, imposed an "impermissible burden upon the
exercise of a constitutional right." Id. at 572. While the Court recognized that Congress
had a legitimate goal in enacting such a statute, the Court nonetheless stated that "Con-
gress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion
of a constitutional right." Id. at 583.
86 406 U.S. 605 (1972). In Brooks, the Court declared unconstitutional a state law
that required a defendant who wished to testify on his own behalf to be the first defense
witness presented. The Court stated that the statute "exacts a price for his silence [pro-
tected by defendant's fifth amendent right against self-incrimination] by keeping him off
the stand entirely unless he chooses to testify first." Id. at 610. Accordingly, the Court
ruled that the statute was "not a constitutionally permissible means of ensuring his [the
defendant's] honesty [because it] ... casts a heavy burden upon a defendant's otherwise
unconditional right not to take the stand." Id. at 610-11.
87 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Id.(Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 Id.(Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall flatly stated that "the Oklahoma
scheme cannot stand." Id. Obviously, for Justice Marshall, then, what the accused was
entitled to under state law was immaterial if that state law violated the accused's consti-
tutional rights.
91 Id. at 2284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS
By ignoring the harmless error test established in Chapman v.
California,92 and the implementation of that test in Gray, the Ross ma-
jority arrived at the incorrect conclusion that the trial judge's failure
to remove venireman Huling for cause, though admittedly an error,
did not adversely affect the petitioner's constitutional right to trial
by an impartial jury. Furthermore, in ruling that the implementa-
tion of peremptory challenges is delegated exclusively to state law
and is not subject to federal review, the Supreme Court provided no
means by which to curb a state peremptory challenge system which
might impermissibly burden an accused's right to an impartial jury.
Consequently, the Court has called the validity of the entire per-
emptory challenge mechanism into question.
A. HARMLESS ERROR AND THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
In arriving at the conclusion that the trial court committed er-
ror under prior Court rulings by failing to exclude Huling, the ma-
jority nonetheless failed to classify the error under the harmless
error criterion established in Chapman. Quoting the decision of
Wainright v. Witt,9 3 the Court stated: "'the proper standard for de-
termining when a prospective juror may be excused for cause be-
cause of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the
juror's view would prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his
oath.' -94 During voir dire, Huling declared that if the jury found
petitioner Ross guilty, he would automatically vote to impose the
death penalty.9 5 The majority conceded that Huling, under the Witt
test, should have been excluded for cause and that, had Huling actu-
ally sat on the jury that had delivered Ross' sentence, the sentence
would have to be reversed.96 However, the majority further stated
that, as Huling did not sit on the jury, and as none of the twelve
jurors who actually sat were either challenged for cause or sug-
gested not to be impartial by petitioner, the petitioner's right to an
impartial jury was not violated by the trial court's error.
97
Though the logic of this decision appears intuitively sound, it
fails to consider with careful scrutiny the test for determining the
92 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the harmless error test.
93 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
94 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2276 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 424).
95 Id. at 2276.




magnitude of a constitutional error specifically required by Chap-
man. In Chapman, the debate focused upon determining when a con-
stitutional error may be considered harmless and therefore not
automatic grounds for reversal of a conviction.98 The Court arrived
at the conclusion that "before a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to clarify a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."99
It is notable that the Ross majority failed to mention the Chap-
man harmless error test in its decision. Moreover, the Ross Court
ignored that portion of the Gray decision explicitly applying the
Chapman test to the facts of that case, facts similar to those in Ross.
In so doing, the Court carved out a new set of constitutional errors
that are to be construed harmless. This new category of non-harm-
less constitutional errors is, however, inconsistent with the prior
Gray ruling.
During the jury selection process in Gray, the State was forced
to use several of its twelve peremptory challenges to remove jurors
opposed to the death penalty when those jurors should have been
removed for cause under the Witherspoon test.100 In Gray, after the
prosecutor had used all of his peremptory challenges, prospective
juror Bounds stated that, although she was opposed to the death
penalty, she could vote to impose it under appropriate circum-
98 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20. In Chapman, the petitioners were convicted after a Cali-
fornia state criminal trial, during which the prosecutor, as then permitted by a state
constitutional provision, extensively and critically commented upon the petitioners' fail-
ure to testify. Id. at 19. The trial judge also instructed the jury that they could draw
adverse inferences from this failure to testify. Id. After the trial, but before the petition-
ers' appeal was considered, the state provision was invalidated by the Supreme Court.
Id. In reversing the conviction, the Court determined that the petitioners had been de-
nied their constitutional rights and that the prosecutor's unconstitutional inferences had
impaired the petitioners' sixth amendment rights. Id. at 24.
99 Id.
100 Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2049 (1987). In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968), the Court examined the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that stated:
"[i]n trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being
examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he
is opposed to the same.' " Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT., ch.38,
para. 743 (1959)). Stating that the statute violated an accused's right to an impartial jury
and due process of law, the Court then established its standard: "that a sentence of
death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the
death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." Id.
at 522. The Witherspoon ruling, therefore, directly addressed the issue of when a pro-
spective juror cannot be removed for cause and created a specific test that endures to-
day. Witherspoon also tangentially addressed the issue of proper grounds for removal of
venireman. Id. at 522 n.21. However, the case that directly addressed the issue of
proper grounds for exclusion ofjurors, and the standard used today for resolving that
issue, is Witt. See infra note 114 for a discussion of that ruling and its relevance to Ross.
910 [Vol. 79
1988] LOST ROLE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 911
stances.' 0 ' In attempting to correct its prior error in failing earlier
to remove jurors for cause, the trial court then erroneously excused
Bounds for cause. The jury ultimately seated sentenced Gray to
death.10
2
The prosecutor argued that the court error of excluding
Bounds was "harmless" under Chapman because, if the original
court error of failing to remove earlier jurors for cause had been
rectified, the prosecutor would still have possessed a peremptory
challenge necessary to oust Bounds from the jury. Yet, the majority
in Gray rejected this argument and stated: "if the court had granted
one or more of his [the prosecutor's] earlier motions to remove for
cause, the prosecutor may have used his peremptory challenges on
other jurors whom he did not strike when he had fewer perempto-
ries to exercise."lOB Thus, the Court stated that, had the trial court
not made the prior error which subsequently proved detrimental to
the prosecutor, the prosecutor still might not have had a peremp-
tory challenge available by the time Bounds came before the court.
Moreover, the majority refused to base the harmless error anal-
ysis upon whether a particular prospective juror was excluded from
thejury. "[R]ather, the relevant inquiry is 'whether the composition
of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the
trial court's error.' "104 Not knowing what the prosecutor's strategy
would have been earlier had he been rightfully restored his peremp-
tory challenges, the Court could not state definitively which jurors
the judge and prosecutor would have struck and which would have
remained. In fact, the Court finally stated in broad fashion that "the
nature of the jury selection process defies any attempt to establish
that an erroneous Witherspoon- Witt exclusion is harmless."' 05
Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to avoid applying the Gray
harmless error ruling to Ross in two ways. First, he stated that the
broad language of the Gray Court was too sweeping to be applied
literally.106 The ChiefJustice based this notion upon Justice Scalia's
dissent in Gray. Justice Scalia's dissent posited that the inconsis-
tency in the Gray holding was the factor preventing the Gray test
from being applied literally. 10 7 He pointed out that the majority
would have allowed the trial judge in Gray to remedy his prior erro-
101 Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2049.
102 Id. at 2050.
103 Id. at 2055.
104 Id. (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., specially
concurring opinion), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982)).
105 Gray, 107 S.Ct. at 2055.
106 Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2273,2278 (1988).
107 Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2061 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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neous rulings by dismissing the entire venire and starting the jury
selection process anew. 108 Surely, according to Justice Scalia, the
creation of an entirely new venire would affect the "composition of
the jury panel as a whole" more significantly than if the trial judge
corrected his prior error merely by removing Bounds. 10 9 ForJustice
Scalia, therefore, and for the majority in Ross, the Gray majority's
inconsistent application of its "composition" standard limited the
Gray ruling to its facts. 110
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to limit Gray to its
facts by noting that in Gray there was uncertainty as to whether the
prosecution could and would have used a peremptory challenge to
remove prospective juror Bounds."' In Ross, however, no specula-
tion was necessary because Huling was removed and did not sit on
the ultimate jury. 112
Yet, neither of the ChiefJustice's attempts to discredit the Gray
ruling's applicability to Ross succeeds. First, while the Gray language
is sufficiently broad to encompass the facts in Ross, it is not so
sweeping as to render it necessarily susceptible to applications sug-
gested by Justice Scalia in his Gray dissent. Gray, contrary to Justice
Scalia's interpretation, stated a broad ruling with explicitly defined
parameters: that "the nature of the jury selection process defies any
attempt to establish that an erroneous Witherspoon- Witt exclusion of
a juror is harmless." ' 13 Those parameters would not allow the ma-
jority in Gray to accept that an erroneous Witherspoon exclusion, such
as the erroneous exclusion of venireman Bounds, could be consid-
ered a harmless error. Furthermore, using the same argument, the
Court in Ross should have reasoned that an erroneous application of
the Witt standard, 14 the failure to remove venireman Huling for
108 Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2061 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2278.
1I Id.
112 Id.
113 Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2055.
114 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). In Witt, the Court clarified its decision in
Witherspoon and reaffirmed its ruling in Adams that the proper standard for determining
when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital
punishment is whether the juror's view would "'prevent or substantially impair the per-
formance of his duties as ajuror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' "Id. at
424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). The Witt ruling expanded upon
Witherspoon in that "the court's holding [in Witherspoon] focused only on circumstances
under which prospective jurors could not be excluded; under Witherspoon's facts it was
unnecessary to decide when they could be." Id. at 422 (emphasis in original). The trial
court error in Ross was the failure to remove venireman Huling when the venireman
should have been removed for cause. The standard enunciated in Witherspoon, as it only
discussed when a venireman "could not be excluded," is applicable to the facts in Gray
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cause when his views concerning the death penalty "would substan-
tially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instruction and his oath,"11 5 could never be considered
harmless error.
Yet, this standard enunciated by the Court in Gray, which
should have obliged the Court to reverse the decision of the lower
court in Ross, does not apply to any and all incidents affecting the
composition of a jury as a whole. Rather, it only applies to those
incidents involving "constitutional error."1 16 While a trial court's
failure to adhere to the standards enunciated in the Witherspoon-Witt
decisions involves just such a constitutional error, Justice Scalia's
example of a trial court's decision to start the entire venire process
anew after making an erroneous for cause ruling does not.117Justice
Scalia's example of a trial court error and an erroneous Witherspoon-
Witt exclusion are distinguishable under Gray. The reason for creat-
ing this constitutional error distinction, as suggested by Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Ross, is that errors caused by failure to apply
standards enacted to safeguard constitutional rights, such as the
Witherspoon-Witt standard, create the possibility of a "tilt" in the jury
composition against the defendant.1 " A trial court error based
upon an erroneous Witt exclusion removes a juror who, while faith-
fully adhering to "his duties as a juror in accordance with his in-
struction and his oath" 119 is likely to be sympathetic toward the
accused. That juror will most likely be hesitant in condoning the
death penalty, except in extreme situations. Further, a court making
such an error will most likely replace that juror with one who has no
reservations about capital punishment and is willing to apply the
death penalty in a far less restrictive manner. While neither juror,
under Supreme Court standards, is unfit for jury duty, systematic or
even one-time exclusion by the court of ajuror hesitant about apply-
ing the death penalty will unfairly bias the jury against the accused.
In contrast, trial court mistakes which do not discount court-
established safeguards to constitutional rights, do not create a tilt in
the jury panel against a defendant and, therefore, do not require
reversal of a judgement.1 20 Justice Scalia's suggestion of a trial
court correcting its own error by starting the entire jury selection
but not to those in Ross. In contrast, the Will standard, based upon the ruling in Adams,
is directly applicable to Ross.
115 Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.
116 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
118 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.
120 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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process anew is just such an example of a trial court error which
does not tilt the jury against the accused. As all veniremen are re-
moved and new ones are chosen in this scenario, there is little likeli-
hood that the jury will be unfairly weighted against the accused.
While certainly the possibility still exists, after completely reselect-
ing the jury, that the final members of the jury may possess free-
wheeling attitudes concerning the use of the death penalty, that
possibility of bias has not been cultivated, encouraged, or made
more likely by the court error. And this is what distinguishes Justice
Scalia's example from an erroneous Witherspoon- Witt exclusion. As
such, Justice Scalia's example would not be grounds for reversal
under the Gray standard. 12 1 Indeed, the language of the Gray ruling
is sufficiently narrow to be applied literally, while simultaneously
avoiding such far-reaching applications as those envisioned by Jus-
tice Scalia.
Secondly, the fact that venireman Huling was removed in Ross
does not erase the uncertainty as to whether "the composition of a
jury panel as a whole"1 22 was affected by the court's failure to ex-
clude Huling for cause. Had petitioner not used his sixth peremp-
tory challenge on Huling, he could have removed one of the jurors
who ultimately sat on the jury that convicted him.' 23 Whether the
petitioner would have removed another juror and whether, if he did
so, that new juror would have affected the composition of the jury is
uncertain. Yet, that uncertainty should have inhibited the Court, as
it did in Gray, from declaring the trial court error "harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt"'124 under the Chapman standard. That the Chap-
man standard was never mentioned in the majority opinion further
demonstrates the majority's fundamental unwillingness to respect
the Court's decision in Gray, which reflected the Court's thorough
consideration of the Chapman standard before making its ruling. 125
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist believed the trial court's error
was indeed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, although he never
121 See id. at 2281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 Gray v. .lississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2055 (1987).
123 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
125 In Gray, the state urged the Court to apply the harmless error analysis formulated
in Chapman. Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2055. However, the Court responded:
[b]ecause the I'itherspoon-Witt standard is rooted in the constitutional right to an
impartial jury and because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integ-
rity of the legal system, the Chapman harmless error analysis cannot apply. We have
recognized that "some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error." The right to an impartial adjudi-
cator, be it judge or jury, is such a right.
Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2056, 2057 (citing and quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).
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explicitly stated this, because none of the twelve jurors who actually
sat were challenged for cause by the petitioner, and, moreover, the
petitioner never argued to the trial court that any of the twelve was
less than impartial. 126 Yet, the mere fact that the petitioner never
challenged the jurors for cause does not necessarily imply that he
would not have exercised a peremptory challenge to remove one of
them. In Swain, the Court stated: "[w]hile challenges for cause per-
mit rejection ofjurors on a narrowly specified, provable, and legally
cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a
real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demon-
strable." 127 Thus, a peremptory challenge can be used when an at-
torney suspects, but cannot prove to the court, that ajuror is biased.
In the case at bar, it is conceivable that the petitioner perceived
a certain bias, detrimental to his position, in one of the twelve ju-
rors. Yet, he might also have believed that any attempt to prove this
bias on reasonable grounds to the judge would have proven futile.
Accordingly, a possible scenario exists, due to the very lack of re-
quirements for exercising a peremptory challenge, in which the peti-
tioner might have exercised a peremptory if he possessed one,
without ever having attempted to remove the juror for cause. The
fact that the petitioner in Ross never challenged any of the twelve
jurors for cause does not erase the uncertainty under the harmless
error test, and that test should have compelled the majority to hold
that the trial court's error unconstitutionally jeopardized the peti-
tioner's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.
128
B. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
On numerous occasions prior to Ross, the Court specifically
stated that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimen-
sion. 129 Yet, the Court has simultaneously, and just as consistently
stated that the peremptory challenge is "one of the most important
of the rights secured to the accused." 130 Indeed, even ChiefJustice
126 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2277.
127 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
128 See supra note 121 and accompanying text for a discussion of harmless error in
relation to Ross.
129 In Stilson, the Court stated that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defend-
ants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured." Stilson v. United
States, 250 U.S. 585, 586 (1919). In Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, the Court restated the Stilson
analysis. In' Gray, 107 S. Ct. at 2054, the majority opinion stated that "[p]eremptory
challenges are not of constitutional origin."
130 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (pro-
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Rehnquist, in a prior dissent, quoted language stating that the per-
emptory challenge is "a necessary part of trial by jury."1 3 1 The
Court in Ross, then, was forced to determine just how much status
the peremptory challenge was to be accorded in light of these two
seemingly contradictory views of the mechanism.
The majority opinion responded by leaving the status and im-
plementation of the peremptory challenge completely at the mercy
of state law. ChiefJustice Rehnquist labelled the peremptory chal-
lenge "a creature of statute" and stated that "it is for the State to
determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to de-
fine their purpose and the manner of their exercise." 1 32 The
"right" to a peremptory challenge is "'denied or impaired' only if
the defendant does not receive that which state law provides."' 33 In
so stating, the Court foreclosed any argument that a party could be
deprived of the right to an impartial jury through the arbitrary dep-
rivation of a peremptory challenge as long as the trial court abided
by state law.
By constructing a ruling that rendered the peremptory chal-
lenge exclusively the child of state law, thereby subjecting it to every
whim of state courts, the Supreme Court devalued the peremptory
in its role as the dominant safeguard of the accused's constitutional
right to an impartial jury. If the ruling in Ross was in any way in-
tended to maintain the historical stature of the peremptory chal-
lenge in the jury selection process, it failed to do so. If, as in Ross, a
defendant must surrender one of his peremptory challenges in or-
der to correct trial court error, even when such error is recognized
by the United States Supreme Court, then certainly the value of the
peremptory in its ability to eliminate subtle prejudices against a de-
fendant, not detectable by the Court in "for cause" proceedings, is
accorded no importance whatsoever.
In contrast, Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion maintains the
stature of the peremptory challenge within the jury selection pro-
cess while refraining from labelling the peremptory challenge as a
constitutionally guaranteed right. It is important to note thatJustice
Marshall, in his dissent, never states that Ross had been deprived of
due process through the arbitrary deprivation of one of his peremp-
tory challenges. Indeed, Justice Marshall could not have argued this
ceedings which allow an accused to be brought face to face with potential jury members
before being compelled to exercise his peremptory challenges are considered "regular"
proceedings)).
131 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132 Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2279 (1988).
133 Id. (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 219).
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point because peremptory challenges themselves, as discussed pre-
viously, are not constitutionally guaranteed.1 3 4 Rather, Justice Mar-
shall's opinion embraces the notion that the implementation of the
peremptory challenge should be delegated to the states, but that
delegation does not condone the construction of capricious state
rules insensitive to the value of the peremptory challenge as "one of
the most important rights secured to the accused." 135 Commenting
upon Jackson13 6 and Brooks, i3 7 Justice Marshall stated that "legisla-
tive schemes that unnecessarily burden the exercise of federal con-
stitutional rights cannot stand."138 The Oklahoma ruling was one
such scheme because it blatantly discredited the role of the peremp-
tory challenge in safeguarding the accused's sixth amendment right
to an impartial jury by forcing the defendant to give up "procedural
parity" 3 9 with the prosecution through useless forfeiture of
peremptories.
Justice Marshall's opinion, if accepted by the majority, would
have provided the Court a means by which to defend the historical
integrity of the peremptory challenge while simultaneously resisting
the notion to overturn precedent and label the challenge a constitu-
tional right. Justice Marshall's opinion could have provided the
Court with a moderate and workable approach. While the peremp-
tory challenge is not a constitutionally protected mechanism in and
of itself, and, therefore remains under state court jurisdiction, state
laws, subject to federal scrutiny, must implement the mechanism on
an efficient and conscientious basis, with an awareness to the role
that the peremptory has played in safeguarding the sixth amend-
ment right to an impartial jury.
Such an interpretation of the constitutional dimensions of the
peremptory challenge would enable the Court to declare unconsti-
tutional particular state laws which impede the efficient use of per-
emptory challenges beyond reasonable limits, while still according
the states autonomy to determine the number of peremptory chal-
lenges granted as well as the general manner in which the chal-
lenges will be exercised. In Ross, this rule would have given the
134 See supra note 121.
135 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). In discussing the impact of the
Oklahoma peremptory scheme on the Petitioners sixth amendment rights in RossJustice
Marshall stated, "The burden on petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights is thus both heavy
and avoidable. Our cases accordingly mandate the conclusion that the Oklahoma
scheme cannot stand." Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 See supra note 85 for an explanation of the Jackson holding.
137 See supra note 86 for an explanation of the Brooks holding.
138 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at 2283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Court the freedom to declare the Oklahoma scheme unconstitu-
tional on sixth amendment grounds without forcing a re-evaluation
of present state rulings regarding peremptory challenges. Such a
ruling would have allowed the courts to continue treating the per-
emptory challenge as merely a procedural device, while at the same
time ensuring the courts' ability to monitor the implementation of a
device which the Court considers "one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused."'
' 4 0
Justice Marshall's view is not entirely novel. In both Swain v.
Alabama,' 41 and Batson v. Kentucky, 142 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause in
relation to racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.
In Batson, the Court declared that peremptory challenges could not
be used to exclude veniremen from a jury solely on account of their
race, and it constructed a federal scheme to safeguard the peremp-
tory challenge mechanism from such abuse.143 In so doing, it em-
phatically proclaimed that peremptory challenges are not merely
140 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
141 In Swain, the petitioner, a black man, was indicted and convicted of rape in Tal-
ladega County, Alabama and sentenced to death. Although petit jury venires in criminal
cases in Talladega County included an average of six to seven blacks, no black bad
served on a petit jury in the County since approximately 1950. In Swain, of the eight
blacks on the venire, two were exempted and the other six were peremptorily struck by
the prosecutor. In its affirmation of the Alabama conviction, the Court stated:
even if a State's systematic striking of Negroes in the selection of petit juries raises a
prima facie case under the Fourteenth Amendment [equal protection clause] we
think that it is readily apparent that the record in this case is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the rule has been violated by the peremptory system as it operates
in Talladega County.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 224.
142 In Batson, a black man was convicted in a criminal trial in which all four black
persons on the venire were peremptorily challenged and removed by the prosecutor,
and the jury which ultimately convicted the defendant was composed only of white per-
sons. In reversing the conviction, the Court rejected the portion of the Swain decision
that held that a defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion only upon proof that the peremptory challenge system as a whole was being per-
verted. The Court then said:
[t]hese principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evi-
dence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defend-
ant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremp-
tory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Sec-
ond, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute ajury selection practice that permits
"'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Finally, the defendant
must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor uses that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury
on account of their race.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
143 See supra note 142 for discussion of the federal scheme established in Batson.
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"creatures of statute"1 44 subject only to state regulation. On the
contrary, the Batson ruling laid explicit ground rules for state imple-
mentation of peremptory challenges. 145 Thus, the argument that
the states should maintain unmonitored control over peremptory
challenges, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated in Ross, ignores
prior federal intervention as exemplified in Batson.
Ironically, it was Justice Marshall who unequivocally stated in
his dissent in Batson that "[t]he inherent potential of peremptory
challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of
jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the court to ban them
entirely from the criminal justice system."1 46 In Ross, Justice Mar-
shall did not completely contradict his prior opinion in Batson but,
rather, tempered his view with the notion that peremptories could
be maintained provided that state implementation of the mechanism
is monitored. 147 The ruling in Batson reflects this absolute need to
allow federal intervention into state implementation of peremptory
challenges when the state scheme has unnecessarily burdened an in-
dividual's constitutional rights. While the state abuse of the per-
emptory in Batson was perhaps more obviously reprehensible than
that in Ross, as it centered upon racial discrimination, racial discrimi-
nation is only one example of the need for federal supervision over
state peremptory schemes. Justice Marshall's dissent in Batson
serves as a reminder of state abuse of peremptories which have
jeopardized anaccused's constitutional rights in the past. Unfortu-
nately, the majority in Ross has ignored the warning of Batson and
has now left the door open for further state abuse of the peremptory
challenge mechanism. In so doing, the Court has unnecessarily
jeopardized a defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Ross virtually ignored the Court's prior
ruling in Chapman and the rationale behind the Gray decision. Con-
sequently, the Court seriously jeopardized the role of the peremp-
tory challenge in securing the accused's sixth amendment right to
an impartial jury by declaring a trial court's error in failing to excuse
a venireman for cause, and the subsequent loss of a peremptory
challenge, in effect, harmless constitutional error. By declaring the
144 Ross, 108 S. Ct. at' 2279.
145 See supra note 142.
146 Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 See supra note 90.
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implementation of the peremptory challenge to be solely under the
jurisdiction of state law, the opinion eliminated a defendant's ability
to declare, under any state system, that he has been unconstitution-
ally deprived of his right to a peremptory challenge. In distancing
the peremptory challenge from sixth amendment rights, the Court,
whether intending to do so or not, has placed the value and the
validity of the entire mechanism into question.
Permitting federal review of state peremptory schemes which
allegedly burden impermissibly an accused's right to an impartial
jury would not have relegated the peremptory challenge to such a
diminutive role. This presumably would have been a positive factor,
assuming the Court's sincerity in its praise, throughout the years, of
the peremptory challenge as a sentinel of sixth amendment rights.
Such a ruling would have permitted federal intervention into the
realm of state rules on peremptory challenges only when necessary
and would not have elevated the peremptory consistently to federal
question status. The Supreme Court's refusal to allow such federal
review paves the way for future state abuse of the mechanism and of
an accused's constitutional rights.
JAMES G. BONEBRAKE
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